The article examines corruption in the civil service as a theoretical and legal problem that has a systemic impact on the sustainable development of the state. The author’s approach is based on the provisions of the theory of state and law, which make it possible to go beyond a narrow sectoral understanding of corruption and to consider it as an institutional deformation of public authority affecting the normative, value-based and managerial foundations of the state-legal system. Particular attention is paid to the role of the civil service as a key institution for the exercise of public authority and for ensuring the long-term sustainability of state development.

The study substantiates that sustainable development of the state in its legal dimension presupposes the reproducibility of legal institutions, public trust in state authority, and the effectiveness of legal regulation. Corruption in the civil service undermines these foundations, as it violates the principle of equality before the law, reduces the regulatory potential of law, and forms stable informal decision-making practices. It is demonstrated that under conditions of corruption the civil service loses its stabilizing function and ceases to act as an institutional mechanism of sustainable development.

The article emphasizes the limitations of predominantly repressive anti-corruption measures and substantiates the need for an institutionally oriented approach to combating corruption, including the development of service ethics, accountability mechanisms and legal culture. It is concluded that anti-corruption efforts should be regarded as an integral part of the strategy for building a sustainable rule-of-law state and effective public authority.